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SECURITIES REGULATION-"SECURITIES" AS DEFINED UNDER SECURI-
TIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SHARES
OF A STATE FINANCED AND SUPERVISED, NONPROFIT COOPERATIVE
HOUSING CORPORATION ARE NOT "SECURITIES"- United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975).
Although the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19342 provide extensive definitions of the term "security,"' the
courts still are endeavoring to determine the scope of that term.' In
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq. (Supp. IV,
1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (Supp. IV,
1975).
3. The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" as follows:
When used in this subehapter, unless the context otherwise requires--
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any cer-
tificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the fore-
going.
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides the following definition of the term
"security":
(a) When used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument com-
monly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, tem-
porary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issu-
ance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal there-
of the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c (1970).
Although the two definitions of the term "security" contain some minor variations, the
United States Supreme Court has observed that they are "virtually identical." Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967). For purposes of the Forman decision, "the
coverage of the two Acts may be considered the same." United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2058 n.11 (1975).
4. See, e.g., 1050 Tenants Corp v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974) (shares of
stock in cooperative housing corporation held securities); Safeway Portland Employees'
Fed. Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner & Co., 501 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1974) (certificates of
deposit purchased by credit union held securities); Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d
183 (9th Cir. 1974) (agreement for restaurant franchise held not a security); Lino v.
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United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,5 the United States Su-
preme Court was given its sixth opportunity to construe the definition of
"security." Although the Court again focused primarily upon the "in-
vestment contract" component of the security definition, for the first
time it failed to find a security in the transaction before it. Nevertheless,
by its retention of the definition of "investment contract" as enunciated
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,8 by its refusal to expand or alter the Howey
definition, 9 and by its virtual rejection of the "literal approach' to the
concept of securities, the Court has offered some guidance to practition-
ers who must deal in this murky area.
The Forman suit was initiated by 57 shareholder-tenants" (respon-
dents in the Supreme Court) of Co-Op City,'" a state subsidized and
supervised nonprofit 8 cooperative housing development. 14  The pet-
City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (franchise agreements held not
securities); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973) (pyramid sale of self-improvement courses held securities).
5. 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975).
6. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hannan &
Thomas]. The issue was previously dealt with in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SECv. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see notes 41-71 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 47-60 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 28-40 and accompanying text infra.
11. "Respondents... sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apartment owners,
and derivatively on behalf of 'Riverbay, the owner and operator of Co-Op City, seeking
upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental reductions, and other 'appropriate'
relief." 95 S. CL at 2056. See also note 15 infra.
12. Co-Op City, with approximately 50,000 residents residing in 35 high rise buildings
and 236 townhouses, is the largest cooperative housing development in the United States.
95 S. Ct. at 2055; REAL ESTATE L. REP., July, 1975, at 1.
13. The Court stated:
The project was organized, financed, and constructed under the New York State Pri-
vate Housing Finance Law, commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted
to ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent low-income urban hous-
ing. In order to encourage private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing,
New York provides them with large long-term, low-interest mortgage loans and sub-
stantial tax exemptions. Receipt of such benefits is conditioned on a willingness
to have the State review virtually every step in the development of the cooperative.
See N.Y. Private Housing Finance Law §§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney's Consol.
Laws, c. 44B, Supp. 1974-75). The developer also must agree to operate the facility"on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 1l-a(2a), and he may lease apartments only to peo-
ple whose incomes fall below a certain level and who have been approved by the
State.
95 S. Ct. at 2055 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the eligibility requirements, see
note 18 infra.
14. There are three different forms of cooperative ownership: the trust form, the co-
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itoners included the three corporations which were responsible for the
construction, promotion and management of the development,"0 several
directors of those corporations, the State of New York, and the State
Private Housing Finance Agency. Respondents' complaint alleged vio-
lations of the fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 193310 and of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.17 Respondents' claims were based
ownership form, and the corporate form. See generally N. PENNEY & R. BROUDE, CASES
AND M&TERIALS ON LAND FINANcING, 113-14 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PENNEY &
BRouDE]; 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 11 633.1-33.4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL]; Castle, Legal Phases of Co-operative Buildings, 2 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1 (1928);
Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 IIv. L. REV. 1407 (1948). Forman
involved the most common form of cooperative ownership, the corporate form:
Under this plan a corporation is organized and the land is conveyed to it; then the
corporation leases specific apartments to the tenant-stockholders of the corporation.
The ownership of corporate shares confers no right of occupancy to an apartment.
The execution of "a proprietary lease" from the owning corporation to the stock-
holder desiring to be a tenant is vital. Such a lease contains the usual clauses of
ordinary apartment leases, but it is unique in that its obtaining and its continuance
depend upon the lessee being the owner of a specified quantity of the shares of the
owning corporation.
PowELL, supra 633.4, at 778 (footnotes omitted).
In contrast to the cooperative form of apartment ownership, a condominium owner
possesses title in fee to his individual apartment unit as well as the undivided ownership
as a tenant-in-common of the common areas. See PENNEY & BROUDE, supra, at 138;
POWELL, supra, 633.1[2], at 768.
With respect to the investment contract formula, the distinction between the coopera-
tive and condominium forms of ownership is relatively unimportant. See, e.g., Report of
the SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. ff 79,265 (Oct. 12, 1972) [hereinafter cited as R.E.A.C.]; REAL ESTATE L. REP.,
July, 1974, at 1. However, the distinction is crucial with respect to the "literal approach"
test of securities. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
The recent upsurge in cooperative and condominium home ownership has specifically
presented the courts with the task of determining the circumstances under which such
interests may be "securities." See generally Parness, Stock in Cooperative Apartment
Corporation as a Security Under Federal Securities Laws, 9 REAL. PROP., PROBArE &
TRUST J. 259, 260 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Parness]. The absence of clear guidelines
has presented the real estate industry with a major problem: when must real estate
projects register with the Securities and Exchange Commission? See Kuklin, Government
Regulation of Real Estate Securities-An Overview, 9 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J.
11, 13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kuklin].
15. United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit membership corporation con-
sisting of labor unions, housing cooperatives and civic groups, was established for the
purpose of "aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe and sanitary housing
accommodations for wage earners and other persons of low and moderate income." 95 S.
Ct. at 2055. Community Services, Inc. (CSI), a wholly owned subsidiary of UHF, was
the general contractor and sales agent of Co-Op City. Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay),
a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, was formed by UHF for the purpose of
owning and operating Co-Op City. For a discussion of corporate housing cooperatives,
see generally note 14 supra.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). In addition to the
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upon an Information Bulletin which had been disseminated by Riverbay,
one of the petitioner corporations, in 1965, prior to the completion of
the project. The purpose of the Bulletin was to induce eligible pros-
pective tenants'8 to purchase shares of stock in Riverbay, thereby per-
mitting the purchasers to occupy apartments in Co-Op City. For
every eighteen shares of stock purchased at $25.00 per share, the
shareholder acquired the right to occupy one room in the develop-
ment. 9 In addition to the initial stock expenditure, each tenant was
required to make a monthly rental payment which served to satisfy
the project's underlying mortgage obligations and current operating
expenses. The 1965 Information Bulletin estimated, on the basis of
projected construction costs,20 that the average monthly rental payment
would be $23.02 per room. In fact, increased construction costs eventu-
ally resulted in an average monthly rental charge, as of July, 1974, of
$39.68 per room.' These increased monthly rental obligations formed
the basis of the fraud allegations in Forman. In addition, the Forman
fraud allegations under the securities acts, respondents charged that the New York State
Financing Agency violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), as well as presenting ten pendent
state law claims. 95 S. Ct. at 2057.
18. "Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not exceed six times
the monthly rental charge (or for families of four or more, seven times the rental
charge)." 95 S. Ct. at 2055 n.1, citing N.Y. Prav. Hous. FIN. LAw § 31(2)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
19. The sole purpose of acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to occupy
an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their purchase is a recoverable deposit on
an apartment. The shares are explicitly tied to the apartment; they cannot be
transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged or encumbered; and they de-
scend, along with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights attach
to the shares as such: participation in the affairs of the cooperative appertains to
the apartment, with the residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote ir-
respective of the number of shares owned.
95 S. Ct. at 2055.
Upon termination of occupancy a tenant shareholder is obligated to offer the stock to
Riverbay at its initial selling price of $25.00 per share. Should Riverbay decline to re-
purchase the stock the sales price of the stock is limited to the initial purchase price plus
a percentage of the portion of the mortgage which the tenant has paid off. In addition,
the tenant is also restricted to selling only to an "eligible" purchaser. See N.Y. PiUV.
Hous. FIN. LAw § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). See also note 18 supra.
20. The 1965 Information Bulletin estimated the total construction cost of the project
to be $283,695,550. Of this total, $32,795,550 was to be obtained through the sale of the
Riverbay stock to the tenants. A 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from the New York
Private Housing Finance Agency was to provide the remaining $250,900,000. 95 S. Ct. at
2056.
21. Ultimately the construction loan was $125,000,000 more than the $250,900,000
estimate contained in the 1965 Bulletin. Id. The increased costs were allocated solely to
the monthly rental charges, while the cost of Riverbay stock remained static. The
increased monthly rental charges caused a corresponding increase in Co-Op City's
income eligibility requirements. Id. at 2056 n.6; see note 18 supra.
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respondents alleged that the petitioners failed to disclose several material
facts to the prospective stock purchasers.2"
Arguing that the shares of Riverbay stock were not securities within
the context of the federal securities acts, the petitioners moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction. Commenting that "the
question before this court is not whether the plaintiffs should be protect-
ed; rather . . . whether or not they are protected by the federal
securities laws,' 23 District Judge Pierce granted petitioners' motion to
dismiss. In so ruling, the District Court rejected the literal approach
under which any instrument labeled stock is mechanically deemed a
security within the ambit of the federal securities laws. Additionally, by
stressing the nonprofit nature of the transaction, the court foreclosed the
possibility of finding that the shares were securities through the applica-
tion of the alternative approach of the Howey investment contract
formula.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed
with the District Court on both issues and reversed. 24 Holding that stock
certificates are securities, the Circuit Court explicitly adopted the literal
approach. 5 In addition, noting that "[p]rofit . . . need not be real-
ized only in capital appreciation,"26 the court found that an expectation
of profit existed in the immediate transaction, thus satisfying the Howey
investment contract test.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and dismissed res-
pondents' complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction on the grounds that
neither the literal test nor the investment contract test was fulfilled.
Disagreeing with both facets of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan, in
22. Respondents maintained that the following material facts were omitted: (i) the
original estimated cost had never been adhered to in any of the previous Mitchell-
Lama projects sponsored by UHF and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the
initial estimate would not be followed in the present project; (iii) CSI was a wholly
owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that it could not have
been legally held to complete the contract within the original estimated costs; (v)
the State Housing Commissioner had waived his own rule regarding liquidity re-
quirements in approving CSI as the contractor; and (vi) there was an additional
undisclosed contract between CSI and Riverbay.
95 S. Ct. at 2056-57 n.7.
23. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975).
24. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975).
25. 500 F.2d at 1252.
26. Id. at 1254. Compare notes 47-60 and accompanying text infra.
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his dissenting opinion,27 argued for both the adoption of the literal
approach and the expansion of the Howey investment contract doctrine.
I. Tim LITERAL APPROACH
The literal approach classifies transactions as being subject to the
federal securities laws solely upon the basis of the labels used by the
offeror. 28 This approach is viable only in those transactions in which the
offeror transfers interests which are expressly held out as stock or other
forms of securities.29
The problem inherent in the literal approach is that it ignores com-
27. Justices Douglas and White joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. 95 S.
Ct. at 2064.
28. "According to this approach the fact that 'stock' certificates are used in a 'stock'
corporation is sufficient in itself to bring transactions in the 'stock' within the literal
definition of the Acts." Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d
Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051
(1975), quoting R. JENNINGS & H. MlAIiSH, SEcuRmrS REGULATION 299-300 (3d ed.
1972), wherein it is stated that "when a stock corporation is used, the securities acts
literally apply. . . ." See also 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1377-78
(2d Cir. 1974). Compare Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Milnarik v. IM-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
The statutory bases of this approach are the specific provisions in the Federal
Securities Acts which state: "[T]he term 'security' means any . . . stock, . . . or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security' . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970); see note 3 supra.
Courts which had adopted the literal approach found support for its use in the United
States Supreme Court decision in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943), wherein the Court stated!
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or de-
scription many documents in which there is a common trading for speculation or
investment. Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much standardized
and the name alone carries a well settled meaning. Others are of more variable
character and were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms, such as "trans-
ferable share," "investment contract," and "in general any interest or instrument
commonly known as a security." . . . Instruments may be included within any of
these definitions, as matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or de-
scription.
Id. at 351 (emphasis added). See Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246,
1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd.sub nom., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S.
Ct. 2051 (1975); 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), afj'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F.
Supp. 806, 808-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afJ'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. at 2059.
29. Prior to Forman, the literal approach was always a viable possibility in transac-
tions involving the corporate form of cooperative home ownership. This was true because
stock is an indispensible element in corporate cooperatives. See POWELL, note 14 supra,
633.4, at 778. However, because of the absence of any interest labeled stock, the literal
approach generally is not applicable to transactions involving the other three forms of
cooperative and condominium ownership. See generally note 14 supra.
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mercial reality by disregarding the substance of the particular transac-
tion before it, and instead focuses upon the form in which that transac-
tion has been framed.30 Cases which have rejected the literal approach
have detected this problem of exalting form over substance."a Such a
test fails to recognize the Congressional intent behind the 1933 and
1934 Securities Acts. In passing these Acts, Congress intended to pro-
tect investors in all securities transactions, whatever the form, through
registration and full disclosure.3 2 These statutes delineated comprehen-
sive lists of various forms of securities33 in order to ensure coverage of
every conceivable form of investment.3 4 Since the list of securities defi-
30. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2059 (1975);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
31. 95 S. Ct. at 2059. Compare Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274,
275-76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
32. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1933). See also SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321
F. Supp. 806, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affl'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Securities Act
Release No. 5211, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,446 (Nov.
30, 1971); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 138 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Main-
stream of Securities Regulation]. Congress "define[d] the term 'security' in sufficiently
broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."
H.R. REP. No. 85, supra at 11. Relying upon this Congressional intent, courts generally
note that the remedial securities legislation "should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). See also United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2067 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171,
1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, Cooperative Housing
Corporations and the Federal Securities Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 127 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Cooperative Housing Corporations].
While the Forman court acknowledged the above Congressional declaration, it held
that the nonprofit Riverbay stock had none of the characteristics "that in our commercial
world would fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, supra at
11; United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, supra at 2060.
In contrast, the California Corporate Securities Law expresses a broader sweep than
the Federal Securities Acts, and does more than merely protect investors. "The required
[California] administrative review is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether
... the proposed issuance of securities if 'fair, just, and equitable.'" Hoisington,
Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law, 14 HAsnNGs L.J. 241, 243 (1963).
California cases have uniformly adopted the substance over form approach. See, e.g.,
People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939); Oil Lease Service, Inc. v.
W.H. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 107-08, 327 P.2d 628 (1958); People v. Yant,
26 Cal. App. 2d 725,736, 80 P.2d 506, 511 (1938).
33. See note 3 supra.
34. Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security," 27 U. MAMI
L. REv. 395, 397 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mofsky].
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nitions in each of the Securities Acts is prefaced with the phrase "unless
the context otherwise requires,"" the purpose of the list is not to em-
phasize the form, but rather the substance of the transaction.36
Although the Forman majority failed to accept the literal approach,
the Court did clarify its status in current law,3 7 setting out a specific
criterion to be met in order for this test to apply. The literal approach is
now viable only in those cases in which the plaintiff is able to prove a
justifiable reliance upon the label given to the instrument purchased,
and a reasonable belief, based on the label affixed, that the instrument
was subject to the federal securities laws. 8  Thus, in future cases,
application of the literal approach will depend upon the reasonableness
of the plaintiff's reliance upon the label affixed to the interest acquired.
The Forman Court proclaimed that the reasonableness of such reliance
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (10) (1970); see note 3 supra. See also SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
36. Most authorities in discussing the issue of "how to determine what is a security"
have noted that the substance of the transaction predominates over its form. See, e.g.,
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d
232, 237 (7th Cir. 1939); L Loss, SEcunmnrs REGULATON 493 (2d ed. 1961). See also
note 32 supra. Such a conclusion is in accordance with the observation of the United
States Supreme Court in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892):
[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers .... This
is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for fre-
quently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to in-
clude an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act.
37. Prior to Forman, the cases had exhibited judicial confusion as to the viability of
the literal approach. See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp.
250 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117 S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975); 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp.
1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974). This confusion may be
traced to dicta in the Court's opinions. For example, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 386 U.S.
332 (1967) (dicta), two conflicting principles are expounded. First, relying upon the
Congressional intent, the Court noted that the definitions of "security" are to be broadly
construed. Id. at 336. See note 32 supra. However, the Tcherepnin Court also stated that
the substance of the transaction should prevail over its form and the emphasis should be
on the economic reality. 386 U.S. at 336. As one court has recently stated, "each of [the
preceding statements] suggest[s] a different resolution" to the determination of what is a
security. Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, supra at 253.
38. 95 S. Ct. at 2059-60. Compare Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. RFP. 1 95,249, at 98,291 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1975), in which the District Court
misconstrued the viability of the literal approach in the wake of Forman.
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will be easier to prove if the instrument has many of the traditional
characteristics normally attributed to a "stock" or "bond."3" It should be
noted that the practical effect of the Forman analysis is to diminish the
usefulness of the literal approach, because an instrument with many of
those characteristics probably satisfies one of the alternative "security"
tests. Thus, if the presence of those common characteristics are the
primary indicia of the reasonableness of one's reliance, the literal test
will be satisfied only in those cases in which one of the other tests also is
satisfied, thereby rendering the literal approach virtually meaningless.40
II. THE HOWEY INVESTMENT CONTRACT FORMULA
4 1
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,42 the Supreme Court confronted the
question of whether an offering of an orange grove parcel, together with
a contract providing for the cultivation and marketing of the produce,
constituted a "security" as defined by the federal securities acts. In
holding that such interests were subject to the provisions of the federal
securities laws, the Court formulated the investment contract test4"
which is currently applied:
39. 95 S. Ct. at 2060. The Forman Court observed that the Riverbay stock lacked
many common attributes of stock. These included the right to receive "dividends
contingent upon an apportionment of profits" (which the Tcherepnin Court declared to
be the most common characteristic of stock, 389 U.S. at 339), common negotiability, the
ability to be pledged or hypothecated, voting rights proportionate to the number of shares
owned and the capability to appreciate in value. 95 S. Ct. at 2060.
40. Other tests, each based upon a separate listing contained within the statutory
definition of the term security, are also available. Especially notable is the investment
contract approach. See notes 42-71 and accompanying text infra.
41. The first statutory use of the term "investment contract" as a definition of
"security" appeared in Minnesota. MINN. GEN. LAws ch. 429, § 3 (1917). See also
Mofsky, supra note 34, at 397. The first case to define the term was State v. Gopher Tire
& Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920), in which the court defined investment
contract as "[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure
income or profit from its employment. . . ." Id. at 938.
While SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) established the current invest-
ment contract formula, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the
first Supreme Court case to use the investment contract concept, enumerated the
principles which were later formulated into the Howey test. Joiner held that assignment
in oil and gas leases were investment contracts within the sphere of the federal securities
laws.
42. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
43. In both Howey and Joiner the Court was called upon to determine whether a real
property interest was a security. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 6, at 274; see note 41
supra. By emphasizing the investment contract qualities of the transactions in question.
rather than distinguishing a real property interest from an investment contract, the
Supreme Court, in these two landmark cases, held that a real property interest may be a
security. Cf. State v. Hirsch, 131 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1956); Note, Legal Characterization
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of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty or Personalty, 73
COLUm. L. REv. 250 (1973) (arguing that a cooperative interest should be recognized as
a distinct legal entity). While these two cases clearly established that a real property
interest may be a security, recent courts have been pressed to determine what real prop-
erty interests are securities. See note 4 supra.
The SEC has acknowledged that not all real property interests are securities. Paul
Gonson, Associate General Counsel for the SEC (see Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae,
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975)), assured the Court
that the SEC was not contending that all multiple housing projects are subject to the
securities laws, but that the SEC merely was asking the Court "not to diminish the scope
of the securities laws." BNA Sac. Rao. & L. RaP. (No. 299) A-12 (April 23, 1975). Ray
Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, recently has voiced a similar view:
Interests in [real] property are not ordinarily securities. We have nothing to do
with the normal buying and selling of interests in [real] property, and we don't
want to have anything to do with it.
Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., San Diego Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, July 2, 1974, cited in
Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes, and
Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411, 425 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Berman & Stone]. The
reluctance of the SEC to regulate all real property transactions stems partially from its
lack of expertise in real estate matters. Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond
Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 653 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Beyond Disclosure].
See also Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 32, at 123-24.
The Forman majority noted what it deemed to be a conflict between the SEC's
position in the Forman case and its prior statements regarding the applicability of the
securities laws to condominium and cooperative developments. 95 S. Ct. at 2063 n.24. In
Securities Act Release No. 5347, supra, at 82,539-40. The release added, however,
79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973), which adopted the recommendations of the SEC Real Estate
Advisory Committee Report (see R.E.A.C., supra note 14) the SEC provided guidelines
concerning the applicability of the federal securities acts to condominiums and other of-
ferings of all types of real estate units which have similar characteristics. The SEC there
listed three specific situations, in any one of which an offering would be viewed as an
offering of a security:
1. The condominiums [or other type of similar real estate units], which any
rental arrangement or other similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on
the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts
of the promoter, or a third party designated or arranged for the promoter, from
rental of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the purchaser must
hold his unit available for rental for any part of the year, must use an exclusive
rental agent or is otherwise materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his
unit.
Securities Act Release No. 5347, supra at 82,539-40. The release added, however,
there may be situations, not referred to in this release, in which the offering of the
[condominium type] interests constitutes an offering of securities. Whether an of-
fering of securities is involved necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances
of each particular case.
Id. 82,540 (emphasis added). In apparent disregard of the latter SEC statement, the
Forman Court found an "unexplained contradiction in the Commission's position," thus
enabling the Court to "accord no special weight to [the SEC's] views." 95 S. Ct. at 2064
n.24. Compare 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1174-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
The following no-action letters reflect the pre-Forman SEC position regarding the
application of the investment contract doctrine to specific multi-unit developments:
Sunriver Properties, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 79,691
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(Dec. 11, 1973) (condominiums with rental management program; salesmen not to ini-
tiate conversations regarding economic benefits, held not investment contracts); Cul-
verhouse, Tomlinson, Mills, DeCarion & Anderson, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L Rm,. 79,612 (Oct. 5, 1973) (retirement condominium, no rental pool ar-
rangement, realtors not to emphasize economic benefits, held not investment contracts);
Tahoe Donner Ski Bowl Condominiums, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,440 (July 18, 1973) (resort condominiums in which prospective purchasers were in-
formed that they had the option to rent their condominiums through developer or other
rental agents, resulted in no opinion because certain rental unit selection procedures were
left to the discretion of the rental agent, and these procedures may determine the exist-
ence of an investment contract); Innisfree Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 79,398 (Apr. 5, 1973) (sale of twelve undivided interests in each resort
condominium unit with each purchaser entitled to two two-week occupancy periods each
year held not investment contracts); Surf Tides Condominiums, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. % 78,686 (Jan. 7, 1972) (resort condominiums,
realtors required not to mention to prospective purchasers the investment possibilities of
units, held not to be investment contracts); Clemson Properties, Inc., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,387 (Aug. 13, 1971) (sale of 222
residential condominium units, each of which included an interest in a corporation
formed to enter into commercial leases of a portion of the project, held not to be
investment contracts where the total estimated -value of the project is some $11,750,000
and the estimated value of the portion to be commercially leased is only some $200,000).
Another indication of the SEC's stance toward the application of the federal securities
laws to cooperative housing associations is Rule 235, 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1975), which
exempts some cooperative housing associations from the Acts' registration requirements.
See generally Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 32, at 135-37. The Rule 235
exemption, like other securities laws exemptions, merely obviates the necessity of
registration. It does not exempt the transaction from the anti-fraud provisions contained
in the federal securities acts. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117,
1132 n.44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c)
(1970). To be eligible for this exemption, the aggregate offering price of all the
securities offered by the association may not exceed $300,000 during any twelve-month
period. This figure is determined by the par value of the stock. See, e.g., Summit House
Tenants Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 78,611 (Jan. 6,
1972) (offering held exempt from registration under Rule 235 where aggregate offering
price of securities was $4,279,293, and par value of all shares did not exceed $300,000);
Lynbrook Gardens Tenants Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,146 (Apr. 27, 1971) (offering held exempt from registration under Rule 235 where
aggregate offering price of securities was $1,768,300, and par value of all shares did not
exceed $300,000). Thus, while a billion dollars worth of cooperatives may theoretically
be sold, this exemption still might be available to the association's stock. Securities and
Real Estate: Where the Twain Meets, A Panel Discussion, 2 SEC. REoG. L.J. 48, 55
(1974). It is also stipulated that the cooperative association may not participate in any
business other than that which "is incidental to the ownership, leasing, management or
construction of such residential properties." 17 C.F.R. § 230.235(2) (b) (1975). For an
analysis of the factors used in determining when such business is "incidental," see Rifkin
& Borton, SEC Registration of Real Estate Interests: An Overview, 27 Bus. LAw. 649,
659 (1972). The Forman respondents argued that the Rule 235 exemption of eligible
cooperative stock from the securities acts is an implicit recognition that such stock is
normally securities within the purview of the federal acts. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(No. 299) A-12 (Apr. 23, 1975). See also 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, supra, at
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[A]n investment contract... means a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.
44
The Forman Court addressed itself solely to the concept of "profit" as
enunciated in the Howey test, specifically focusing on the requirement
that there be an expectation of profit solely15 from the efforts of a
promoter or a third party.
4"
1174. The Court in Forman apparently disposed of this argument through its rejection of
the SEC's views because of contradictions found in the SEC's position. 95 S. Ct. at 2063-
64 n.24.
44. 328 U.S. at 298-99. This Howey test has been criticized since its inception. See id.
at 301, where Justice Frankfurter stated in dissent: "'Investment contract' is not a term
of art; it is a conception dependent upon the circumstances of a particular situation."
Recent commentators have subjected the Howey formula to a heavy barrage of criticism,
often including suggested alternative formulations of an investment contract definition.
See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is there a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 W. Rns. L. Rnv. 367 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey]; Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, supra note 32, at 174; Long, Interpreting the Statutory
Delinition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 96, 128
(1974) ("A security is the investment of money or money's worth including goods
furnished and/or services performed in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation
of some benefit to the investor where the investor has no direct control over the
investment or policy decisions of the venture."). Criticism of Howey and the interpreta-
tion given to it by the courts, has not been limited to commentators, however. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); State Comm'r of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d
105, 108-09 (Hawaii 1971).
45. In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the word 'solely' should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition
those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities." Id. at 482. The
Supreme Court in Forman, noting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the word "solely,"
declined to express any view thereon. 95 S. Ct. at 2060 n.15. See also 1050 Tenants Corp.
v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974), and the cases cited therein, in
which the courts state that even if the shareholder-tenants of private cooperative housing
corporations exercised "some small role in the management of the venture," the Howey
reliance element still would be satisfied.
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2064-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Forman courts did not find it
necessary to examine the first element of the Howey test, investment in a common
enterprise, because this factor is an inherent characteristic of the cooperative form of
ownership. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246, 1253-54 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051, 2064-65 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Compare 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
alP'd, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld
Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Regarding the third element of the Howey test, reliance on the efforts of a third party,
the Forman District Court, while noting that the satisfaction of this element might be
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The courts applying the Howey test generally have recognized two
modes of profit: (1) capital appreciation and (2) income from the
investment.47 Each of these modes stresses the existence of some form of
tangible return to the investor. In Forman, the Court refused to expand
the Howey concept of profits to include a return of strictly intangible
benefits.
Because of the general requirement that any stock in Co-Op City be
resold at its initial purchase price there was no possibility that the
purchases in Forman could result in profit in the form of capital
appreciation.4 8 Presumably, in a case presenting a fact situation such as
that found in 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson,40 in which there were no
such restrictions on the sale of the cooperative stock, the Court would
find the profit element to be satisfied.50 However, the Forman majority
opinion does not guarantee that such a result would follow.' 1
Relying upon the alternate mode of profit, the shareholder-tenants in
Forman contended that three different types of income resulted from
their investment. First, they argued that the tax deductions permitted for
questionable where the development is a small cooperative, observed that "it would be
specious" to question the fulfillment of this element in the case of the huge Co-Op City
Cooperative. 366 F. Supp. at 1128. The Second Circuit disposed of the issue simply by
stating that this element of the Howey test definitely was established under the particular
circumstances of the case before it. 500 F.2d at 1253-54. The Supreme Court, in
emphasizing the absence of the profit element of the Howey test, did not find it
necessary to expressly reach the issue of the absence or presence of the third element.
Compare 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, supra, in which the court found that the sale
of shares of stock in a private cooperative housing corporation satisfied the Howey
criteria. The District Court found the reliance element fulfilled by the following three
factors: (1) the project's "sponsors had complete control over initial financial arrange-
ments and the general guidelines under which the Corporation [continues to operate]";
(2) in the event of occurrence of certain contingencies (which did not here occur), the
project's sponsors would be represented on the Board of Directors; and (3) the project's
sponsors obligated "the Corporation to at least nine contracts, including one. . . which
extended for three years past the time the shareholders were supposedly in complete
control." Id. at 1176-77.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 2060.
48. See Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1129 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975). See also notes 13, 15 & 19 supra.
49. 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. In 1050 Tenants, the District Court, distinguishing the Forman fact situation, held
that there was a possibility of profit on the transfer of partially restricted shares. Even
though the 1050 Tenants Corporation shares could not be severed from the lease and
could not be transferred without the consent of the Corporation, the absence of any
restrictions prohibiting the transfer of the shares at a price higher than that originally
paid by the shareholder resulted in a possibility of profit realization. 365 F. Supp. at
1172, 1175.
51. See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
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that portion of the monthly rental charge which applied to interest on
the Co-Op City mortgage52 constituted a return of income on the
shareholders' investments. Noting that "[tihese tax benefits are nothing
more than that which is available to any homeowner who pays interest
on his mortgage," the Court refused to hold that such tax deductions
constitute income."5
The Court also refused to recognize that rental charges which were
substantially below that which was charged for comparable housing
constituted income on an investment, saying:
The low rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided
by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be liquidated into cash;
nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense,
it no more embodies the attributes of income or profit than do welfare
benefits, food stamps or other governmental subsidies. 54
The Court similarly rejected the respondents' third income conten-
tion, "the possibility of net income derived from the leasing by Co-Op
City of commercial facilities, professional offices and parking spaces,
and its operation of community washing machines,"5 5 holding that these
essential services were provided as a convenience for the tenants rather
than as a means of producing income.56
52. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 216.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2062. Compare id. at 2065 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 1050 Tenants
Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1275, 1375
(2d Cir. 1974); Pine Grove Manor, Section No. 1, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
171 A.2d 676, 685 (N.J. Super. 1961); Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 27 Pa.
D. & C.2d 405, 414-20 (C.P. 1961), affd, 183 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1962).
The Forman majority opinion also stated that even if these tax deductions constituted
profits, they would not fulfill the Howey requirements because they did not result from
the efforts of third parties. 95 S. Ct. at 2062 n.19. Compare id. at 2065-66 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
54. 95 S. Ct. at 2062. Compare id. at 2065 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Forman v.
Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1254-55 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom.,
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975); Pine Grove Manor,
Section No. 1, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 171 A.2d 676, 685 (NJ. Super. 1961);
State ex rel. Troy v. Lumberman's Clinic, Inc., 58 P.2d 812, 816 (Wash. 1936), in which
the court stated:
Profit does not necessarily mean a direct return by way of dividends, interest, capi-
tal account, or salaries. A saving of expense which would otherwise necessarily be
incurred is also a profit to the person benefited. If respondent renders to its incor-
porators or members or to businesses in which they are interested and in whose
profits they share, a service at a cost lower than that which would otherwise be
paid for such service, then respondent's operations result in a profit to its members.
See also Berman & Stone, supra note 43, at 422-24.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2062.
56. Id. at 2062-63. Compare id. at 2065 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 1050 Tenants Corp.
v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d
1975],
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In refusing to recognize any of these three items as income derived
from an investment, the Court highlighted the distinction between a
benefit and profit.57 The Court viewed the preceding three items as
benefits which resulted from the respondents' purchase of housing, a
commodity.58 In contrast, under the Court's analysis, profit stems from
an investment. The Forman majority's initial determination that the
respondents had failed to make an investment in the immediate transac-
tions automatically foreclosed any finding of profit within the context of
the Howey formula. While the majority could have extended the concept
of profit to include the return of purely intangible benefits such as those
present in Forman, it specifically refused to do so.5" Herein lies the
major distinction between the majority and dissenting Forman opinions.
The majority perceived the transactions in question as solely the pur-
Cir. 1974); Pine Grove Manor, Section No. 1, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 171
A.2d 676, 685-86 (N.J. Super. 1961); Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 27 Pa.
D. & C.2d 405, 414-20 (C.P. 1961), aff'd, 183 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1962).
The Forman majority also relied upon two other factors in rejecting the respondent's
argument: (1) the 1965 Information Bulletin did not mention the use of such income to
offset rental costs; and (2) the lack of any proof that these services in fact returned a
profit. 95 S. Ct. at 2062.
The Internal Revenue Code, which permits a cooperative housing corporation tenant
stockholder to take the same tax deductions allowed an individual homeowner, conditions
this right upon the corporation having at least 80% of its gross income derived from the
tenant stockholders. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954 § 216(b)(1)(D). Because of this re-
quirement, it is unlikely that any cooperative corporation would maintain commercial
facilities from which it would derive a substantial portion of its gross income. Berman &
Stone, supra note 43, at 423.
57. Compare Berman & Stone, supra note 43, at 422 (benefits are not profit), with
Pine Grove Manor, Section No. 1, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 171 A.2d 676, 685-
86 (N.J. Super. 1961); Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 405,
414-20 (C.P. 1961), afj'd, 183 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1962); Coffey, supra note 44, at 403; and
Mainstream of Securities Regulation, supra note 33, at 165-67 (all contending that
benefit is profit). See also Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?,
45 B.U.L. REv. 465, 496-97 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
In refusing to equate the concept of benefit with that of profit, the Supreme Court
rejected the expansive interpretation which the Second Circuit had given to the Howey
test. The Court thus has shielded against the following alarmist possibility:
A misguided extension of the Second Circuit's broadly drawn and somewhat con-
torted reasoning with respect to the investment contract concept . . . could be ad-
vanced whereby the profit motivation required under Howey would be found when-
ever a purchaser has the possibility of anticipating any type of advantage from a
particular purchase. Hence, an unwary court could be prevailed upon to rule that
the second circuit decisions support an interpretation of Rowey which covers vir-
tually any real estate unit sale, for practically every purchase of a real estate unit
involves an anticipation of some form of financial benefit or advantage, whether
it be in the nature of a future sale, tax saving, or the like.
Berman & Stone, supra note 43, at 424.
58. See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
59. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
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chase of housing; the dissent viewed the transactions as both the pur-
chase of housing and the making of an investment. 60
In concluding that respondents had purchased only a commodity, and
had not also made an investment, the majority placed considerable
importance upon the 1965 Information Bulletin 61 which had been circu-
lated to the respondents prior to their purchases of their cooperative
interests. The Court utilized the Bulletin as the foremost indication of
the respondents' intent at the time that they entered into those purchase
transactions. 2 Because the Bulletin referred only to the residential
nature of those purchases, and failed to make any reference to the
purchase of these cooperative interests as investments entered into for
profit,6 3 the majority determined that "the inducement to purchase was
solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to invest for
profit." 64 In so holding, the Court expressly reserved deciding whether
the federal securities laws would govern a different transaction, one in
which the purchaser is clearly induced by the offer of both a commodity
and an expectation of profit.6 5 Thus, the Court failed to determine
whether the Howey expectation-of-profit element is present in the typi-
cal condominium or cooperative purchase in which the seller induces the
purchaser to buy by stressing both the commodity aspects and the profit
potential of the investment. 66
60. Compare 95 S. Ct. at 2063, with id. at 2066-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 95 S. Ct. at 2061, 2062. See also id. at 2066 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Compare Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 95,249
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1975), a post-Forman decision in which the court also emphasized
the importance of the promoters' advertising brochures as the primary indication of the
purchaser's intent. Id. 98,290-91. See also Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties,
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Cal. 1975), in which the court tempered the
importance of the purchaser's intent, saying, "[b]uying land with expectations of profit
does not make the transaction a security."
63. 95 S. Ct. at 2061.
64. Id. at 2060. See also id. at 2061, 2063, 2064.
65. Id. at 2061 n.16. See also id. at 2064; Parness, supra note 14, at 265.
66. Several articles which were written before the Court's opinion in Forman sought
to warn real estate salespersons of potential security law hazards if inducements to
purchasers were phrased in terms of profit potential. One such article made the following
suggestions:
In order to minimize the possibility of application of the securities acts, develop-
ers should carefully structure their sales and marketing programs to eliminate in-
ducements to purchase based upon the expectation of profit through the developers'
efforts. Mere reference by salesmen to the general application of land values would
not appear to make the sale of real estate units constitute a sale of securities; but
the establishment of rental pools, resale arrangements managed by developers, guar-
antees of investment return based upon increases in the value of completed develop-
ments, or encouragement of multi-unit lot purchases could well result in security
status. . . . [S]uch sales should not constitute a sale of securities in the absence
of inducements which emphasize the profitability of the investment.
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Forman also provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
adopt the "risk capital" approach as a replacement or an alternative to
the profit element of the Howey investment contract test0 7 This ap-
proach, first adopted by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski,8 provides that an investment is subject to the
federal securities laws if the investor risks capital, regardless of whether
or not the investment is made with an expectation of profit.00 The effect
of the risk capital approach is to expand the scope of the securities laws
by extending their coverage to some transactions which fail to satisfy the
three-pronged Howey test. The Forman majority, refusing to abandon
the profit requirement, stated that the case was not an appropriate one
in which to adopt the risk capital approach because "[p]urchasers of
apartments in Co-Op City [took] no risk in any significant sense." 0
Berman & Stone, supra note 43, at 413. See also id. at 429-31; Pamess, supra note 14, at
265-66. The primary impetus behind these warnings appears to be the SEC pronounce-
ments regarding the applicability of the federal securities laws to condominiums and
cooperatives, and the subsequent SEC no-action letters. See note 43 supra. In the wake of
the Court's failure to definitively resolve the issue of the applicability of the federal
securities laws to the typical condominium or cooperative sales transaction, the afore-
mentioned suggestions should be given careful consideration.
67. The Ninth Circuit recently refused to expressly adopt the risk capital approach in
a case in which the District Court opinion seemingly embraced this expansive test. SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g, 348 F. Supp. 766
(D. Ore. 1972). In endorsing the use of the risk capital approach, the Turner District
Court relied upon the Congressional intent that the federal securities laws be given a
liberal interpretation, with emphasis on the economic realities, so as to effectuate their
remedial purposes. 348 F. Supp. at 771-74; see note 32 supra. By relying upon the
Congressional intent, as well as the fact that the three-pronged Howey test is not
expressly mandated by statute, the Court could, if it so chose, adopt the risk capital
approach to enlarge the sweep of the federal securities laws. However, the restrictive
interpretation of "security" which the Court established in Forman suggests that the
present Court would not be inclined to adopt the expansive risk capital approach. See
generally note 74 and accompanying text infra.
68. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
69. Id. at 815. See, e.g., Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1130
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975); Sobieski, Securities Regulation in
California: Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A.L. RFv. 1, 5-7 (1963); Tew & Freedman,
In Support of SEC v. W.I. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the
Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27
U. Mim L. Rav. 407 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tew & Freeman]; Comment,
Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALn. L. REv. 299,
339 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Community Apartments]. See also Hannan & Thomas,
supra note 6, at 284-85.
70. 95 S. Ct. at 2063 n.23. Because of the pervasive New York State supervision of the
Co-Op City project, the court reasoned that purchasers therein were subject to no capital
risk. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 6, at 248 n.114. But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975
at 1, col. 1. The Supreme Court observed that "[tlo date every family that has with-
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Thus, the Forman Court failed to resolve the question of whether real
estate developers and sellers whose transactions satisfy the risk capital
standard, but fail to satisfy the Howey expectation-of-profit requirement
are subject to the federal securities laws. The prudent developer or seller
who falls within such a classification must consider the potential conse-
quences of a failure to either register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission or qualify for one of the registration exemptions.
7 1
I. CONCLUSION
In Forman, the Court manifested its reluctance to extend the protec-
tive umbrella of the federal securities laws to persons who are essentially
mere purchasers of a commodity.72 While the direct effect of the Court's
holding is to generally preclude purchasers of real property interests
drawn from Co-Op City has received back its initial payment in full." 95 S. Ct. at 2056
n.5.
71. The penalties for a failure to comply'with the registration requirements can be
harsh. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771 77o (1970);
Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (Supp. IV, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. §
77 (1970). The imposition of these penalties can also extend to the offeror's attorney.
See generally Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities
Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1189 (1973).
A project may avoid the registration requirements through any one of three exemp-
tions. First, a private offering, Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1970), and Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), is exempted. See generally Erwin,
Marketing Investment Condominiums and Real Estate Syndications "Without" Securities
Registration: SEC Rule 146, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J.'l19 (1974); Grimes & King, A Look at
Condominium Offerings Under the Federal Securities Laws-For the Idaho Lawyer, 9
IDAHo L. REv. 149, 159-61 (1973); Note, SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement
Exemption, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1123 (1974). Second, an offering made exclusively
intrastate, Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970), and Rule
147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975), is exempted. See generally Grimes & King, supra, at
161-64; Kant, SEC Rule 147-A Further Narrowing of the Intrastate Offering Exemp-
tion, 30 Bus. LAw. 73 (1974); Olson & Fein, The Single-State Condominium Offering, 4
REAL EsTATE REv. 78 (1974); Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 32, at 132-
34; Comment, SEC Rule 147-Distilling Substance From the Spirit of the Intrastate
Exemption, 79 DicK. L. REv. '18 (1974). Third, a limited or small offering, Securities
Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970), and Rule 235, 17 C.F.R. § 230.235
(1975), is exempted, See generally Grimes & King, supra, at 164-66.
The primary reason for avoiding registration via one of the aforementioned exemp-
tions is to avoid the great expenditures of time and money which are necessary for the
completion and filing of an SEC registration. Ellsworth, Condominiums Are Securities?,
2 REAL ESTATE LJ. 694, 699 (1974); Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the
Securities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CiN. L. REV. 779, 783 (1971). See also Klein,
Preparation of an SEC Registration 'Statement for an Offering of Condominium Units, 2
REAL ESTATE LJ. 461 (1974).
72. But cf. Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Brown, 38 Fla. Supp. 123 (Broward
County Cir. Ct. 1973).
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from utilizing the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts, the indirect
effect of Forman is to encourage the establishment of a more appropri-
ate mode of regulation.
73
By its virtual rejection of the literal approach and its refusal to expand
the parameters of the Howey investment contract formula, Forman
typifies the retrenchment of the Burger Court from the activist stances of
73. It is generally agreed that there is a definite need for some type of federal
regulation of the rapidly proliferating modes of community home ownership. See, e.g.,
R.E.A.C., supra note 14, at f 82,772; Kuklin, supra note 14, at 13; Miller, supra note 57,
at 468; Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 32, at 122, 139; Wall Street J.,
Oct. 6, 1975, at 22, cols. 1-3; cf. Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation of Con-
dominium in California, 14 HAST GS LI. 222, 226-37 (1963). While its form is yet
to be determined, "increased regulation appears to be inevitable." Kuklin, supra note 14,
at 16.
Most commentators who addressed the issue prior to Forman concluded that the SEC
is not the proper agency for the regulation of the sale of residential real estate. See, e.g.,
Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study
in Government Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. Ray. 785, 789-90 (1974); Tew & Freedman, supra
note 69, at 407-08; Beyond Disclosure, supra note 43, at 665-69; Note, 41 BROOKLYN L.
RFv. 1283 (1975); Note, 53 TEXAS L. Rav. 623, 634-35 (1975); cf. Community
Apartments, supra note 69, at 341. Contra, Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra
note 32, at 139. See also note 43 supra.
Ten separate bills have been introduced in the first session of the 94th Congress deal-
ing with the regulation of these interests. S. 2273, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
10150, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 7966, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
7752, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975); H.R. 4748, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3763,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975); H.R. 3586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2348, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2347, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 228, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). All of these bills are specifically applicable only to condominiums.
Most of these bills provide for regulation by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD). The most prominent of the aforementioned bills, S. 2273, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (The Condominium Consumer Protection Act of 1975), "is de-
signed to give the maximum protection to the condominium buyer with the minimum
amount of expense and red tape for the developer." 121 CONG. REc. S 14,967 (daily
ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (remarks of Senator William Proxmire co-sponsor of S. 2273). The
bill, which establishes federal condominium requirements to be enforced by the states
or through private lawsuits, has recently received the endorsement of the Ford Admin-
istration. Wall Street J., Oct. 7, 1975, at 40, col. 2. While this recent congressional
concern about the protection of condominium purchasers is encouraging, it would be ad-
visable for Congress to expressly provide that any such remedial legislation extend to
other types of community home ownership, particularly to cooperatives.
Federal regulation is also available through two other existing government agencies:
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
However, under existing law, the scope of any protection which may be provided by
these two agencies is limited. See generally Berman & Stone, supra note 44, at 429;
Ingersol, A Landmark Ruling Hits the Land Developers, 4 REAL ESTATE Rav. 100
(Fall 1974); Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 32, at 122-23; Beyond
Disclosure, supra note 43, at 650.
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the Warren Court.74 Forman suggests that in a future case the present
Court might be inclined to further restrict the application of the Howey
formula by emphasizing the importance of the distinction between the
purchase of a commodity and the making of an investment. Such
emphasis might result in the Court holding that even when the three
elements of the Howey test are satisfied, an investment contract within
the penumbra of the federal securities laws is not established if the
primary motivation of the purchaser is to obtain a commodity.
David J. Pasternak
Victor 0. Tufford
74. See generally Green, Supreme Court Shows Pro-Business Tilt in Series of Rulings,
Wall Street J., July 1, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Wall Street J., Dec. 9, 1975, at 4, cols. 2-4.
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